Dukalskis Et Al 2024 Transnational Repression

Binary indicator equal to 1 if an authoritarian state carried out one or more transnational repression events (threats, arrests, extraditions, abductions, assassinations) against its own citizens abroad in a given country-year, 0 otherwise. Source: AAAD (Dukalskis 2021).

Count of transnational repression events carried out by an authoritarian state against its own citizens abroad in a given country-year. Ranges from 0 to 61 (Uzbekistan 2005). Source: AAAD (Dukalskis 2021).

Inverted V-Dem Civil Liberties Index (CLI), measuring the intensity of domestic state repression. The CLI aggregates three component indices: physical violence index (torture, killings), political civil liberties index (censorship, parties, civil society), and private civil liberties index (forced labor, property rights, religion). Higher values indicate more repression. Lagged one year in analysis. Source: V-Dem v12, Coppedge et al. 2022.

Number of diplomatic representations (embassies, consulates, and other missions) a state maintains abroad in a given year. Captures the logistical infrastructure enabling a state to project repression transnationally. Source: Diplometrics Diplomatic Representation dataset (Moyer et al. 2021), 1960-2020. Mean in sample: 50.8, range: 1-170.

Latent measure of state capacity aggregating 21 variables across three conceptual pillars: extractive capacity, coercive capacity, and administrative capacity. Estimated via item response theory model. Source: Hanson and Sigman (2021), State Capacity Dataset v1. Mean in sample: -0.059, range: -1.541 to 1.28.

Revised combined Polity score measuring level of authoritarianism/democracy on a scale from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Used as control for regime type. Source: Marshall and Gurr (2020). Mean in sample: -4.46.

Log of the incumbent ruler's cumulative time in office (years). Controls for the possibility that crackdowns occur around regime consolidation periods and that repression spikes during transitions. Source: Bell, Besaw, and Frank (2021). Mean: 4.60 log-years.

Domestic repression (inverted V-Dem CLI) is positively and significantly associated with subsequent transnational repression in the bivariate model: β=1.09, SE=0.20, p<0.001 (logistic regression, country and year FE, N=857 country-years). This is the first large-N quantitative confirmation that domestic crackdowns predict TR.

Domestic repression remains positively and significantly associated with transnational repression after adding controls for polity score, elections, leader tenure, military and party dimension, population, GDP per capita, and state capacity: β=0.83, SE=0.26, p<0.01 (Model 2, logistic regression with country/year FE, N=731).

The interaction between domestic repression and diplomatic representation abroad is positive and statistically significant (β=0.15, SE=0.05, p<0.01, Model 4). States with high diplomatic capacity are substantially more likely to translate domestic crackdowns into transnational repression than states with few diplomatic ties. The predicted probability of TR increases drastically for states with high diplomatic representation when domestic repression increases, but not for states with few representations.

The interaction between domestic repression and state capacity is not statistically significant (β=0.01, SE=0.03, Model 3, N=731). General state capacity does not significantly moderate the domestic-to-transnational repression pathway, in contrast to diplomatic capacity which does.

State capacity index is positively and significantly associated with transnational repression in the main model (β=0.20, SE=0.05, p<0.001, Model 2). More capable states are more likely to engage in TR, though the interaction with domestic repression does not reach significance.

Leader tenure (log) is negatively associated with transnational repression (β=-0.37, SE=0.18, p<0.05, Model 2), suggesting that more consolidated, longer-tenured regimes are somewhat less likely to engage in TR, possibly because they face fewer acute threats.

Robustness checks confirm the main finding across alternative specifications: conditional logistic regression (bife package), Poisson, negative binomial, and OLS models all yield statistically significant positive relationships between domestic and transnational repression. Results also hold when disaggregating TR events by target type (activists, journalists, citizens) and action type (threats, arrests, extraditions, assassination attempts).

An increase in domestic repression by an authoritarian state is likely to lead to a subsequent increase in transnational repression, because crackdowns at home (1) drive dissidents abroad who then become targets, and (2) activate state surveillance of international links that can be seen as threats to regime stability.

Diplomatic capacity abroad (number of embassies and consulates) moderates the domestic-to-transnational repression pathway: states with greater diplomatic infrastructure are significantly more likely to translate domestic crackdowns into transnational repression, as diplomatic presence provides the logistical means to execute TR in host countries.

Basic analysis workflow for the transnational_repression domain.

Install this PAX into your Praxis instance: