Rivalry Nag Cooperation

A state's level of satisfaction with the prevailing outcome in a rivalry, operationalized via prior MID outcomes: +1 (satisfied, won previous dispute), -1 (dissatisfied, lost), 0 (neutral/drawn). Derived from Maoz & Mor (2002) rivalry supergame framework. Dissatisfied states with low capabilities are the primary candidates for NAG support as a substitution strategy.

Ratio of the potential supporter's military capabilities to the NAG's target's capabilities. Computed as average of shares of military expenditures and military personnel (CAPRAT). Values < 1 indicate weaker supporter; > 1 indicate stronger. Weak dissatisfied states ('frustration games') and capable constrained states ('opportunity games') both increase NAG support probability.

A rivalry game type in which the focal state is dissatisfied with the status quo (SATISFLEV = -1) but lacks the capabilities to challenge it directly (CAPRAT < 1). Supporting NAGs targeting the rival serves as a low-cost substitution strategy to harass the rival and potentially weaken its capabilities without risking direct retaliation.

A rivalry game type in which the focal state is dissatisfied with the status quo (SATISFLEV = -1) and has the capability to change it (CAPRAT > 1) but is deterred from direct confrontation by political constraints. Supporting NAGs allows the capable state to pursue strategic goals while managing domestic or international accountability costs.

Number of years the rivalry has been in existence up to time t. Longer rivalries are associated with higher probability of NAG support (+204% over full range in strategic rivalries, Table 3). Entrenched rivalries feature more polarized preferences and greater frustration with the status quo.

Aggregate maximum hostility level of MIDs in the rivalry divided by rivalry duration. Captures the relative severity of the rivalry over time. Higher intensity rivalries are associated with more NAG support (+22% in strategic rivalry sample, Table 3).

The effect of state-NAG cooperation on the probability of direct conflict escalation between the supporter and the target. State-NAG support significantly increases target's MID initiation (coeff 1.441**, Table 4) and level of hostility against the supporter, making NAG sponsorship a strategy that ultimately intensifies rather than substitutes for direct confrontation.

Higher capability ratio (supporter/target) reduces NAG support probability by ~52% (all dyads, Table 3), while formal alliances reduce support by ~16-41%. Trade ties and joint democracy also suppress support, indicating that institutional interdependence substitutes for indirect confrontation.

Frustration games (dissatisfied + weak) increase NAG support probability by ~106% and opportunity games (dissatisfied + capable but constrained) by ~159% relative to non-game baseline in voluntary support sample (Table 3, Model II), confirming that both types of strategic dissatisfaction drive NAG cooperation.

Rivalry duration increases NAG support probability by ~204% over its full range in strategic rivalries (Table 3, Model III); longer-standing rivalries show substantially higher support rates, consistent with accumulated frustration and entrenched preferences for indirect confrontation.

State-NAG cooperation significantly increases the probability of MID initiation by the target against the supporter (coeff 1.441**, p<0.05, Table 4, Model I), indicating that NAG sponsorship as a rivalry management strategy is escalatory rather than substitutive.

Install this PAX into your Praxis instance: