Explains why externally sponsored rebel groups engage in more civilian abuse through a principal-agent framework. External funding creates moral hazard by reducing rebel need for civilian cooperation; but sponsor characteristics (democracy, human rights lobbies) and competition among multiple principals moderate this effect. Tested with negative binomial regression on count data of one-sided violence, dyad-year structure.
The study of how rebel groups decide to target or spare civilians, with focus on how external sponsorship affects these incentives through principal-agent dynamics. Covers one-sided violence, atrocity commission, and civilian victimization by non-state armed groups.
external-funding-moral-hazard
External Funding Moral HazardThe mechanism by which external state funding reduces rebel incentives to maintain civilian cooperation. Rebels relying on external resources no longer need to extract resources from the population through taxation or civilian support networks, reducing the cost-benefit calculus that otherwise deters mass atrocities. Creates agency slack in the principal-agent relationship between sponsor and rebel.
sponsor-democracy
Sponsor DemocracyBinary indicator for whether a rebel group's external sponsor is a democracy (democ_supdum), or continuous proportion of democratic sponsors (perc_dem). Democratic sponsors are more sensitive to human rights concerns and face stronger domestic accountability pressures, making them more likely to condition support on rebel restraint of civilian targeting. Moderates the negative effect of external funding on civilian safety.
multiple-principals
Number of External SponsorsCount of distinct state actors providing external support to a rebel group (num_supp). Multiple principals create a collective action problem: no single sponsor can effectively monitor and discipline the rebel agent, each free-riding on others' oversight efforts. Higher values associated with more civilian abuse due to reduced effective monitoring.
human-rights-lobby
Human Rights Lobby StrengthCount of human rights organization secretariats in the sponsor state (hrosecretariat_sum). States with stronger human rights advocacy sectors face greater domestic pressure to condition foreign support on rebels' conduct toward civilians. Operationalizes the 'principled' dimension of sponsor oversight beyond formal democratic institutions.
civilian-abuse
Civilian Abuse by Rebel GroupsCount of civilian fatalities from one-sided violence perpetrated by rebel organizations (UCDP One-Sided Violence dataset). Operationalized as 'best estimate' of annual civilian deaths (rebbest). Overdispersed count variable modeled with negative binomial regression. Key dependent variable for testing how external sponsorship affects rebel restraint of violence against noncombatants.
Domain: Rebel Civilian Violence and Accountability
The study of how rebel groups decide to target or spare civilians, with focus on how external sponsorship affects these incentives through principal-agent dynamics. Covers one-sided violence, atrocity commission, and civilian victimization by non-state armed groups.
Temporal scope: Post-Cold War period | Population: Rebel group-years with active conflict and potential external state sponsorship
Install this PAX into your Praxis instance:
praxis_import_pax("rebel-sponsorship-civilian-abuse.pax.tar.gz", install=True)