Explains why states in strategic rivalries choose to support non-state armed groups (NAGs) targeting their rivals. Develops a rational choice model of rivalry management via indirect confrontation using frustration and opportunity game typologies. Tests with original triad-year data covering 175 NAGs and 83 state supporters, 1946-2001. Key finding: strategic rivalry increases NAG support probability by ~300%; state-NAG cooperation escalates rivalry conflicts.
The study of how interstate rivalries shape states' decisions to support non-state armed groups targeting their rivals. Encompasses both the causes of state-NAG cooperation (rivalry characteristics, satisfaction, capabilities) and the consequences for rivalry escalation.
status-quo-satisfaction
Status Quo SatisfactionA state's level of satisfaction with the prevailing outcome in a rivalry, operationalized via prior MID outcomes: +1 (satisfied, won previous dispute), -1 (dissatisfied, lost), 0 (neutral/drawn). Derived from Maoz & Mor (2002) rivalry supergame framework. Dissatisfied states with low capabilities are the primary candidates for NAG support as a substitution strategy.
capability-ratio
Capability Ratio (Supporter/Target)Ratio of the potential supporter's military capabilities to the NAG's target's capabilities. Computed as average of shares of military expenditures and military personnel (CAPRAT). Values < 1 indicate weaker supporter; > 1 indicate stronger. Weak dissatisfied states ('frustration games') and capable constrained states ('opportunity games') both increase NAG support probability.
frustration-game
Frustration GameA rivalry game type in which the focal state is dissatisfied with the status quo (SATISFLEV = -1) but lacks the capabilities to challenge it directly (CAPRAT < 1). Supporting NAGs targeting the rival serves as a low-cost substitution strategy to harass the rival and potentially weaken its capabilities without risking direct retaliation.
opportunity-game
Opportunity GameA rivalry game type in which the focal state is dissatisfied with the status quo (SATISFLEV = -1) and has the capability to change it (CAPRAT > 1) but is deterred from direct confrontation by political constraints. Supporting NAGs allows the capable state to pursue strategic goals while managing domestic or international accountability costs.
rivalry-duration
Rivalry DurationNumber of years the rivalry has been in existence up to time t. Longer rivalries are associated with higher probability of NAG support (+204% over full range in strategic rivalries, Table 3). Entrenched rivalries feature more polarized preferences and greater frustration with the status quo.
rivalry-intensity
Rivalry IntensityAggregate maximum hostility level of MIDs in the rivalry divided by rivalry duration. Captures the relative severity of the rivalry over time. Higher intensity rivalries are associated with more NAG support (+22% in strategic rivalry sample, Table 3).
nag-escalation-effect
NAG Support Escalation EffectThe effect of state-NAG cooperation on the probability of direct conflict escalation between the supporter and the target. State-NAG support significantly increases target's MID initiation (coeff 1.441**, Table 4) and level of hostility against the supporter, making NAG sponsorship a strategy that ultimately intensifies rather than substitutes for direct confrontation.
Domain: Strategic Rivalry and NAG Cooperation
The study of how interstate rivalries shape states’ decisions to support non-state armed groups targeting their rivals. Encompasses both the causes of state-NAG cooperation (rivalry characteristics, satisfaction, capabilities) and the consequences for rivalry escalation.
Temporal scope: 1946-2001 | Population: Triad-years (NAG, NAG target, potential state supporter in target’s PRIE), 1946-2001
Install this PAX into your Praxis instance:
praxis_import_pax("rivalry-nag-cooperation.pax.tar.gz", install=True)